THREATHUNTHQ // FIELD MANUAL

ThreatHuntHQ // Practical field manual

PNPT Master Exam Playbook

A chronological, interactive penetration-testing field manual for reconnaissance, enumeration, initial access, Active Directory, privilege escalation, lateral movement, troubleshooting, evidence collection, and reporting.

  • Exam preparation
  • Attack-path methodology
  • Interactive checklists
  • Local progress storage
Scope reminderThis guide is for authorized labs and the PNPT exam environment. Confirm current exam rules and rules of engagement before testing. Do not assume persistence, destructive actions, social engineering, or any particular bypass technique is permitted.

01 Exam mindset and methodology

1.1 The objective

Approach the PNPT as a professional penetration tester conducting an authorized engagement. Your job is not simply to run tools and collect vulnerabilities. Your job is to identify weaknesses, validate them, chain findings, achieve the defined objectives, and communicate the results.

  1. Identify the attack surface.
  2. Discover and validate security weaknesses.
  3. Establish initial access.
  4. Enumerate the internal environment.
  5. Identify privilege-escalation opportunities.
  6. Move laterally where justified.
  7. Achieve the engagement objectives.
  8. Document the attack chain and report professionally.

1.2 Core decision-making process

  • What do I know, and what have I not enumerated?
  • What assumptions am I making?
  • What evidence supports my hypothesis?
  • What privileges do I currently possess?
  • What additional access could this provide?
  • What is preventing progress, and what alternative paths exist?

1.3 Rules of engagement

02 Reconnaissance and OSINT

2.1 Objective

Develop an understanding of the target organization before actively probing infrastructure. Use information gathered to form testable hypotheses, not assumptions.

2.2 OSINT checklist

2.3 Tool references

ToolPurposeUseful output
theHarvesterEmail and domain discoveryPublicly indexed addresses and hosts
WHOISDomain registration researchRegistrar and registration metadata
AmassAttack-surface and subdomain discoveryRelated domains and hosts
SubfinderSubdomain enumerationCandidate subdomains
crt.shCertificate transparencyCertificate-associated hostnames
Shodan / CensysInternet asset discoveryExposed services and infrastructure
Wappalyzer / WhatWebTechnology identificationFrameworks, servers, and components
LinkedIn / search enginesOrganizational researchRoles, vendors, and technology clues

2.4 Decision point

Attack surface incomplete?

Continue domain, subdomain, certificate, DNS, and public infrastructure discovery. Record uncertain leads for later validation.

Attack surface mapped?

Build an asset inventory, correlate hostnames and IPs, prioritize in-scope externally accessible systems, and begin active enumeration.

Operational noteA public employee identity or guessed email format is not proof of a valid account. Validate only within the authorized environment.

03 External enumeration

3.1 Objective

Identify exposed services, application technologies, potential vulnerabilities, and authentication opportunities. Identify the service, understand its behavior, and validate suspected weaknesses rather than relying solely on scanner output.

3.2 Nmap command reference

# Host discovery
nmap -sn TARGET_RANGE

# Default scripts and service/version detection
nmap -sC -sV TARGET_IP

# All TCP ports
nmap -p- -T3 TARGET_IP

# Detailed enumeration of selected ports
nmap -sC -sV -p PORTS TARGET_IP

# Save results in multiple formats
nmap -sC -sV -oA target_scan TARGET_IP

Choose timing and scan options appropriate to the scope and environment. Avoid aggressive scans where the rules of engagement prohibit them.

3.3 Common service investigation

Service / PortInvestigate
FTP / 21Anonymous access, permissions, exposed files
SSH / 22Authentication, version, configuration
SMTP / 25Mail configuration and permitted enumeration
DNS / 53Records, transfers, misconfiguration
HTTP(S) / 80, 443Application, authentication, technologies, access controls
SMB / 139, 445Shares, permissions, SMB configuration
RPC / 135Windows RPC exposure and enumeration
LDAP(S) / 389, 636Directory services and domain information
RDP / 3389Remote access exposure and controls
WinRM / 5985, 5986Remote management exposure and authorization

3.4 Web application assessment

3.5 Tool references

Nmap NSE: service-specific enumeration. Burp Suite: proxying and web application testing. OWASP ZAP: web security testing. Gobuster / Feroxbuster: content discovery. WhatWeb: technology fingerprinting. Nikto: web server checks.

3.6 Decision points

  • Open port: identify service and version, enumerate configuration, research relevant weaknesses, and validate.
  • Web application: map functionality, test access controls, inspect inputs, and identify information exposure.
  • Credentials discovered: record source and account type, then validate only against authorized services.

04 Initial access

4.1 Objective

Obtain an initial foothold through a validated, in-scope weakness. Initial access may come from a vulnerable service, web application issue, exposed credentials, weak authentication, or another permitted attack vector. Do not assume it must originate from the website.

4.2 Initial access checklist

4.3 First commands after access

whoami
id
hostname
uname -a
ip addr
ip route
cat /etc/os-release
whoami
whoami /all
hostname
systeminfo
ipconfig /all
route print
net user
net localgroup administrators

4.4 Questions to answer

  1. What account am I using: local or domain?
  2. What privileges do I possess?
  3. Is the machine domain-joined?
  4. What other systems can I reach?
  5. What credentials or configuration information are accessible?
  6. What security controls or network restrictions are present?
Troubleshooting branchAccess fails: recheck scope, reachability, vulnerability assumptions, service versions, authentication prerequisites, and error messages. Access succeeds but is limited: enumerate the host and account context before deciding whether local escalation or another attack path is appropriate.

05 Internal enumeration and Active Directory

5.1 Objective

Understand relationships among users, computers, groups, services, trusts, and permissions. Build an accurate model of the environment before attempting escalation.

5.2 Domain discovery commands

whoami /user
whoami /groups
echo %USERDOMAIN%
echo %LOGONSERVER%
set
nltest /dsgetdc:DOMAIN

5.3 Active Directory enumeration checklist

5.4 Tool references

ToolPurpose
BloodHoundActive Directory relationship and attack-path analysis
SharpHoundBloodHound data collection
PowerViewActive Directory enumeration
NetExecNetwork, SMB, and Windows service enumeration
ImpacketWindows protocol and authentication utilities
enum4linux-ngSMB and Windows enumeration
ldapsearchLDAP queries
smbclientSMB share enumeration and access
ADExplorerActive Directory exploration

5.5 BloodHound methodology

  1. Collect authorized Active Directory data.
  2. Import the data into BloodHound.
  3. Review domain structure and privileged objects.
  4. Examine relationships and candidate attack paths.
  5. Investigate the permissions and prerequisites behind each path.
  6. Validate relevant relationships in the environment.
  7. Document the result and the access it provides.

Relationships worth recognizing include GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, AddMember, ForceChangePassword, AdminTo, MemberOf, HasSession, and delegation relationships.

Decision pointA BloodHound path is a hypothesis, not proof of exploitation. Identify the exact relationship, affected object, required privileges, and expected outcome before acting.

06 Credential attacks

6.1 Objective

Identify opportunities to obtain additional credentials or authenticate using material already discovered. Protect captured credentials and hashes as sensitive evidence.

6.2 Techniques to understand

TechniqueWhat it doesKey distinction
KerberoastingRequests service tickets associated with SPNs for offline password analysis.Ticket material is not plaintext password.
AS-REP RoastingTargets accounts configured without Kerberos preauthentication.Depends on account configuration.
Password sprayingTests a small candidate set across accounts.Account lockout and authorization rules matter.
Credential reuseTests discovered credentials in other permitted contexts.Authentication does not guarantee authorization.
Pass-the-HashUses NTLM hash material for authentication where supported.Not password cracking.
NTLM relayRelays authentication in vulnerable configurations.Requires specific protocol and signing conditions.
LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoningMay capture challenge-response authentication material.Captured material may require offline analysis.
Offline crackingAttempts password recovery from captured hashes.Success depends on password strength and candidate coverage.

6.3 Kerberoasting workflow

  1. Enumerate domain accounts and identify accounts with SPNs.
  2. Determine whether the account is a relevant, in-scope target.
  3. Request the applicable service-ticket material using an approved method.
  4. Preserve the resulting hash securely.
  5. Attempt offline password recovery.
  6. Validate any recovered credential in an authorized context.
  7. Review account group membership, privileges, and potential escalation value.

6.4 Credential investigation checklist

6.5 Troubleshooting

  • Hash won't crack: validate format and cracking configuration, then consider password strength and alternate avenues.
  • Pass-the-Hash fails: verify hash format, protocol support, reachability, NTLM restrictions, and account permissions.
  • Credentials work on one host only: distinguish local from domain accounts and examine service-specific authorization and account restrictions.

07 Privilege escalation

7.1 Objective

Move from the current security context to a more privileged one. Separate local privilege escalation from domain-level privilege escalation.

7.2 Windows investigation checklist

Windows tools: WinPEAS, PowerUp, Seatbelt, PrivescCheck, AccessChk.

7.3 Linux investigation checklist

Linux tools: LinPEAS, Linux Exploit Suggester, pspy, GTFOBins.

7.4 Decision points

  • Local administrator/root obtained: reassess accessible credentials, privileged sessions, network access, and whether the host is a stepping stone.
  • No path found: recheck enumeration completeness, permissions, installed software, scheduled tasks, and credentials.
  • Domain privilege path identified: validate the specific relationship and prerequisites before attempting escalation.

08 Lateral movement and network pivoting

8.1 Objective

Expand access from the initial foothold to other authorized systems. Treat lateral movement as a chain of validated identity, authorization, and network-reachability conditions.

8.2 Lateral movement checklist

8.3 Tool references

NetExec: network authentication and enumeration. Impacket: Windows protocol utilities. Evil-WinRM: WinRM access in authorized labs. smbclient: SMB access. Chisel / SSH: tunneling. Proxychains: routing supported applications through proxies.

8.4 Pivoting questions

  1. Which network interfaces and routes exist?
  2. Which internal hosts can the compromised system reach?
  3. Which services are available internally?
  4. Are outbound connections restricted?
  5. Which approved tunneling methods are permitted?

8.5 Troubleshooting

  • Reachable but authentication fails: verify credentials, authentication method, account scope, and permissions.
  • Internal host unreachable: check routes, segmentation, firewall policy, and whether an authorized pivot is possible.
  • Tunnel fails: verify endpoints, listener, port availability, routing, and connection errors.

09 AV, EDR, and egress restrictions

9.1 Objective

Understand how defensive controls affect testing and troubleshoot failures methodically. The PNPT includes assessment of AV bypassing and egress restrictions; study the concepts and permitted lab techniques in the current course material.

9.2 Defensive control discovery

9.3 Failure triage matrix

Observed failureInvestigate
Payload blockedEndpoint detection, antivirus, or application control
Process terminatesEndpoint policy, process controls, or execution failure
Reverse connection failsFirewall, routing, listener, or egress filtering
DNS lookup failsResolver configuration or DNS filtering
Download failsProxy, TLS, DNS, or network restrictions
Script won't executeExecution policy, application control, or interpreter issue
Troubleshooting ruleA failed connection is not automatically a failed exploit. Separate network connectivity, authentication, authorization, execution, and endpoint protection as independent layers.

10 Domain compromise and objective validation

10.1 Objective

Demonstrate the required level of compromise against the Active Directory environment and Domain Controller. Local administrator access is not automatically domain compromise.

10.2 Final validation checklist

10.3 Reconstruct the attack chain

  1. How was the organization and attack surface discovered?
  2. What weakness provided initial access?
  3. Which account and host were compromised?
  4. What internal information was discovered?
  5. What weakness or permission enabled escalation?
  6. How did lateral movement occur?
  7. How was the final objective achieved and validated?
Persistence cautionDo not establish persistence simply because high privileges were obtained. Only test persistence when explicitly authorized and necessary. Prioritize objective validation and evidence over unnecessary environmental changes.

11 Reporting and debrief

11.1 Objective

Communicate the engagement so another security professional, IT administrator, or executive can understand what happened, why it matters, and how to fix it.

11.2 Evidence collection checklist

11.3 Suggested report structure

  1. Executive Summary: purpose, scope, overall posture, major findings, business impact.
  2. Scope and Methodology: systems, dates, authorized activities, limitations.
  3. Findings: title, severity, affected assets, description, evidence, impact, reproduction, remediation.
  4. Attack Narrative: initial access through final objective.
  5. Remediation: prioritized corrective actions.
  6. Conclusion: overall assessment and key recommendations.

11.4 Finding template

Reusable finding format

Finding ID / Title / Severity:

Affected host and IP:

Account / context:

Description: What was discovered?

Technical details: How was the weakness identified?

Reproduction steps: Numbered, concise, repeatable steps.

Evidence: Screenshot, command output, and timestamp references.

Impact: What could an attacker achieve?

Remediation: What should the organization change?

Related findings: Which other weaknesses contributed to the attack chain?

12 Troubleshooting decision matrix

Use this when progress stalls. Determine why a technique failed before abandoning an attack path.

SituationNext investigative step
No hosts discoveredCheck scope, connectivity, discovery assumptions, and routing.
Host discovered, no useful portsReview scan coverage and permitted port enumeration.
Open port, unknown servicePerform service fingerprinting and protocol-specific enumeration.
Service identified, no vulnerabilityInvestigate configuration, authentication, and access control.
Web application inaccessibleCheck DNS, TLS, routing, and application response.
Initial access unsuccessfulReassess vulnerability evidence, prerequisites, and target assumptions.
Access obtained, no progressEnumerate host, identity, privileges, and reachable systems.
No obvious BloodHound pathReview collection coverage, object relationships, and permissions.
Kerberoast hash won't crackValidate format and offline-analysis configuration; investigate other paths.
Credentials failCheck account scope, protocol, restrictions, and authorization.
Privilege escalation failsReassess local configuration, permissions, and enumeration completeness.
Lateral movement failsSeparate reachability, authentication, and authorization issues.
Pivot failsInvestigate routing, firewall, listener, and tunnel configuration.
Payload blockedIdentify endpoint controls and use only permitted testing alternatives.
Notes are disorganizedPause, consolidate notes, and update evidence references.

13 Interactive note-taking templates

The tables below are editable. Use the controls under each table to add rows or columns. Click a cell to enter your own values. Your changes are saved in this browser.

13.1 Asset inventory

IP AddressHostnameOSPortsServicesNotes

13.2 Credential inventory

Sensitive informationDo not store plaintext passwords, tokens, or private keys in this page or in exported progress files. Use a secure password manager or approved secret store. Track references and context instead.
AccountTypeSource / evidence refPrivilegesValidated?

13.3 Attack path tracker

StepSystemAccount / contextDiscoveryResultNext action
1

13.4 Activity log

Date / timeTargetCurrent accountActivity and reasoningResult / evidenceNext action

13.5 Phase notes

14 Tool quick reference

CategoryPrimary tools
OSINTtheHarvester, Amass, Subfinder, Shodan, Censys
Network scanningNmap
Web testingBurp Suite, ZAP, Gobuster, Feroxbuster
SMB enumerationNetExec, enum4linux-ng, smbclient
Active DirectoryBloodHound, SharpHound, PowerView
Kerberos and Windows protocolsImpacket, Rubeus
Password analysisHashcat, John the Ripper
Windows escalationWinPEAS, PowerUp, Seatbelt, PrivescCheck
Linux escalationLinPEAS, pspy, GTFOBins
Lateral movementImpacket, NetExec, Evil-WinRM
PivotingChisel, SSH, Proxychains
Network analysisWireshark, tcpdump
DocumentationCherryTree, Obsidian, Markdown, screenshots

Tool familiarity matters, but knowing when and why to use a tool—and how to interpret its output—is more important.

15 Final PNPT readiness checklist

Reconnaissance

External penetration testing

Internal enumeration and Active Directory

Credential attacks and escalation

Lateral movement and defensive controls

Reporting

16 Final field principles

01 // Enumerate before exploiting

Don't overlook information that could reveal a simpler or more reliable attack path.

02 // Follow the evidence

Don't force a technique just because you know how to use it.

03 // Think in attack chains

Each compromised account or system may create another opportunity.

04 // Understand the environment

Topology, domain relationships, permissions, and controls matter.

05 // Troubleshoot methodically

Separate connectivity, authentication, authorization, execution, and endpoint protection.

06 // Document continuously

Reconstructing a penetration test from memory is a poor strategy.

07 // Understand impact

Demonstrate what an attacker can achieve, not just which tools were executed.

08 // Keep the objective in sight

Avoid spending excessive time on interesting but irrelevant findings.

09 // Validate findings

A scanner result or theoretical path is not equivalent to demonstrated compromise.

10 // Think like an attacker; report like a professional

Technical depth and clear communication are both part of the engagement.

When you obtain access to a system, don't immediately ask which exploit to run next.

Ask: Where am I? What do I have? What can I access? What can I discover? What privileges can I obtain? Where can I go from here?

The objective is not to demonstrate that you know a hundred tools. It is to demonstrate that you can independently identify, validate, chain, and communicate security weaknesses to achieve an authorized engagement objective.

THREATHUNTHQ // PNPT MASTER EXAM PLAYBOOK // LOCAL INTERACTIVE EDITION